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Abstract 
 
Concerns over conflicts of interest (COI) in academic research and medical practice continue 
to provoke a great deal of discussion. What is most obvious in this discourse is that when 
COIs are declared, or perceived to exist in others, there is a focus on both the descriptive 
question of whether there is a COI and, subsequently, the normative question of whether it 
is good, bad or neutral. We contend, however, that in addition to the descriptive and 
normative, COI declarations and accusations can be understood as performatives. In this 
article, we apply J.L. Austin’s performative speech-act theory to COI discourses and illustrate 
how this works using a contemporary case study of COI in biomedical publishing. We argue 
that using Austin’s theory of performative speech-acts serves to highlight the social 
arrangements and role of authorities in COI discourse and so provides a rich framework to 
examine declarations and accusations of COI that often arise in the context of biomedical 
research and practice. 
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Introduction 
  
Physicians, academic researchers, public administrators, elected representatives and many 
others are expected to act in the public’s interest. Financial gain, family obligations, or 
ideological commitments are expected to be secondary to their primary obligations 
(Thompson, 1993). Actions that allow secondary interests to interfere with primary interests 
are often assigned the label “conflict of interest”.  Indeed, hardly a day goes by without a 
professional or public figure being accused of “conflict of interest” (COI) and demands being 
made for greater transparency and/or regulation to ensure that the COI does not taint the 
profession or compromise the public interest. For the most part, such calls to action are 
accepted uncritically. And to the extent that critical voices are added to the discourse at all, 
they are usually either descriptive—focusing on whether the discourse about COI is factually 
correct—or normative—focusing on whether it is morally or legally appropriate to assign the 
label. While descriptive and normative accounts are important, we argue that they fail to 
address an important dimension of COI-related discourse: the “performative” dimension.  
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In this article, we explain what is meant by performative speech-acts, apply this idea to COI 
discourses, and illustrate how understanding COI as performative speech acts works using a 
contemporary case study of COI in biomedical publishing. We argue that using Austin’s 
theory of performative speech-acts serves to highlight the social arrangements and role of 
authorities in COI discourse and provides a rich framework for examining declarations and 
accusations of COI that often arise in the context of biomedical research and practice. 
 
I. The “performative” dimension of language 
 
Words do things. Although this is an uncontroversial point among linguists and philosophers 
of language, words often slip into the background of daily life, leaving their activity 
unnoticed. In his 1955 James lectures, J.L. Austin famously drew attention to the connection 
between physical actions and the act of saying something (1975 114). He observed that 
statements do not merely describe a state of affairs or convey information, but can effect a 
state of affairs. To illustrate his point Austin used the following examples: “I will take this 
person to be my spouse”, “I bet you a dollar it will rain tomorrow” or “I bequeath my watch 
to my brother”. These sentences, according to Austin, do not merely describe what is being 
done. Rather, to utter these words ‘is to do it’ (Austin, 1975 6). Austin called these 
utterances “performative” as they perform an action.  
 
Austin’s theory of performative speech acts has provoked a wide literature that crosses 
traditional disciplinary boundaries of continental and analytic philosophy, anthropology and 
linguistics. John Searle, H.L.A. Hart, Judith Butler and Pierre Bourdieu are some of the 
prominent philosophers and theorists who have engaged with Austin’s ideas on 
performative speech acts. The purpose of this section is not to review all the varieties of 
uses Austin’s theory has been put to, or the criticisms it has faced. Rather, we outline 
Austin’s core theory and draw on some of Bourdieu’s criticisms to highlight pertinent 
aspects in considering how performative speech act theory may inform our understanding of 
conflict of interest discourse in biomedical publishing. 
 
As mentioned, Austin was interested in the way certain sentences did something in the 
world, rather than merely describing the world. Austin proposed that we refer to sentences 
that do something as performative sentences or utterances. As he put it, the ‘name is 
derived, of course, from “perform”, the usual verb with the noun “action”: it indicates that 
the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as 
just saying something’ (Austin, 1975 6-7). Performatives should not be thought of as a 
frivolous “performance” in the sense of a charade that masks true intentions. Indeed, as 
Austin’s examples of marriage vows or Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of Catholic rituals indicate, 
performatives are often solemn and earnest acts with significant consequences (1991).   
 
There are four key features of performatives. First, performatives produce effects in the 
world. Edmund Erde writes that the ‘performative meaning is the effect speakers expect to 
achieve beyond merely informing their audience’ (1996 13). It is important to emphasise 
that this is not merely affecting or influencing audiences through rhetoric, but effecting 
states of affairs. 
 
Second, performatives depend on specific circumstances and social arrangements in order 
to produce their effect. As Austin indicated, a performative is not simply the uttering of 
words – ‘a good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go right if we are 
to be said to have happily brought off our action’ (Austin, 1975 14). Many of those ‘things’ 
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fall within what Austin referred to as the social arrangements in which the speech act 
occurs. To have its desired effect, the pronouncement of “Not guilty” requires a host of 
background and foreground features to be in place. It needs to be uttered by the judge, who 
has heard the case, after the appropriate trial procedures have been followed, in a court in 
which the judge has jurisdiction and so on. Thus for Austin, we must look beyond the actual 
words uttered and ‘consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued – the total 
speech-act’ (Austin, 1975 52). 
 
It is in relation to social arrangements that Pierre Bourdieu’s work on performatives is 
important. Bourdieu criticised Austin for failing to adequately follow through with the 
analyses of the social conditions and conventions of speech acts, and instead keeping his 
analysis within remit of formal linguistics. For Bourdieu, performative speech acts could not 
be isolated from the institutions that set the conditions of discourse (1991 8). An institution 
for Bourdieu was a durable set of social relations that endow individuals with power, status, 
and resources to act and speak in certain ways, and to be understood by others within that 
set of social relations (1990 192ff). The social arrangements of institutions establish the 
conditions in which performatives can be made and effects achieved (Hall, 1999). 
 
The third feature of performatives is that they depend for their effects on the authority of 
the speaker. This, in turn, is determined by the social arrangements that condition 
performative speech acts. Austin’s examples of naming a ship or marrying a couple 
emphasised the necessity of an authoritative speaker in order for a speech act to be 
effective. However, the influence that social arrangements have on the authority of 
speakers, and the boundary between inappropriate persons and inappropriate 
circumstances is not always clear. Austin uses the example of a clergyman baptizing the 
wrong baby with the right name (Austin, 1975 35). The clergyman has the authority, but the 
social arrangements are not quite right. 
 
The authority of the speaker is derived from, and exercised within, certain social 
arrangements. This was a central concern for Bourdieu. He contended that the ‘power of 
words is nothing other than the delegated power of the spokesperson’ (Bourdieu, 1991 107). 
The delegation of this power comes from ‘outside’ the speaker and is orchestrated by the 
social arrangements in which the speech act takes place. It is not just an office-bearer 
speaking, but also the symbolic capital manifest in that office that makes the speech 
effective. The authorized speaker, according to Bourdieu, is only able produce an effect on 
others and social arrangements ‘because his [sic] speech concentrates within it the 
accumulated symbolic capital of the group which has delegated him and of which he is the 
authorized representative’  (Bourdieu, 1991 110-111).  
 
Bourdieu also believed that the success of the speaker and the discourse uttered ‘is 
dependent on the combination of a systematic set of interdependent conditions which 
constitute social rituals’ (Bourdieu, 1991 111). For Bourdieu, the power of language derives 
not from the words themselves, or solely the authority of the speaker, but ‘in the 
institutional conditions of their production and reception’ (Bourdieu, 1991 111). Discourses 
of authority, such as a sermon, lecture or, as we are arguing, a declaration or accusation of a 
conflict of interest is not dependent on a compelling enunciation. Rather, each of these 
discourses ‘exercises its specific effect only when it is recognized as such’ (Bourdieu, 1991 
113), and it is the social arrangements in which the discourse is uttered that enable the 
necessary recognition.  
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This brings us to the fourth key feature of Austin’s performatives: their dependence on 
whether the combination of the first three features results in a felicitous (i.e. recognised) or 
infelicitous (i.e. misrecognised) speech act.  According to Austin, while performatives have 
the grammatical make-up of a statement, ‘when more closely inspected, [they are] quite 
plainly, not utterances which could be “true” or “false”’ (Austin, 1975 12). A performative 
utterance that we may be tempted to call ‘false’ – promising to bequeath a watch you no 
longer possess to a sibling – is ‘not indeed false but in general unhappy’ (Austin, 1975 14). 
That is, the utterance does not meet the various criteria of the social arrangements in which 
it is uttered. 
 
Austin outlined two main categories of infelicitous performatives: Misfires and Abuses. 
Misfires occur when the act is purported but void due to misinvocation or misexecution of 
procedure. Abuses occur when the act is professed but is hollow. That is, the procedure is 
followed but is done so with insincerity or disloyalty (Austin, 1975 16). However, Austin is 
quick to point out that infelicitous performatives due to misfires or abuses are not 
necessarily without effect. Following the procedures of marriage when one of the couple is 
already married, for example, is a “misfire” through which we ‘have most interestingly have 
committed the act of bigamy’ (Austin, 1975 17). 
 
Austin’s marriage example can illustrate the process by which we might determine whether 
a performative is felicitous or infelicitous. In uttering ‘I will’ a person potentially alters the 
social reality of their relation with another person. However, for this potential to be fulfilled, 
the appropriate social arrangements need to be in place. A priest or celebrant needs to be 
present. The couple getting married need have a status that is permitted to enter into 
marriage (e.g. being a human being, of a certain age, who is not currently married etc). And 
in relation to these social arrangements, the speaker needs to have the authority to speak. 
The best man cannot say ‘I will’ on behalf of the groom, nor can photographer say ‘I 
pronounce you married’ on behalf of the priest or celebrant. With these features in place, 
the speech act ‘I will’ is not determined true or false, but felicitous or infelicitous. That is, the 
speech act either happily or unhappily performs the intended action of marriage.  
 
To recap, performatives produce effects in the world, depend on specific social 
arrangements, require an authorised speaker, and can be either felicitous or infelicitous. We 
contend that these features provide a useful analytic lens for examining declarations, 
accusations and judgements of conflicts of interests in biomedical literature.  
 
II. The performative nature of declarations, accusations and judgments of conflict 
of interest  
In professional life, conflicts of interest (COI) are most commonly managed through 
declaration of interests prior to accepting a particular position, publishing research or 
performing a role. Indeed, failure to declare a COI, or an inadequate declaration of COI, can 
result in accusations of corruption from a whistle-blower, journalist or ombudsman. These 
declarations and accusations are often accepted at face value. To the extent that they are 
questioned, this usually centres on whether or not secondary interests are impeding primary 
interests—i.e. whether or not a COI exists—and, if so, whether this is good, bad or neutral.  
 
With few exceptions, declarations, accusations and judgments of COI have generally not 
been conceived as performative utterances (Brody, 2007; Erde, 1996). Rather the 
overwhelming focus has been on whether a description of the state of affairs is accurate and 
whether this state of affairs is good or bad. However, there are a number of features of the 
statements about COI that can usefully be examined as performative acts—most notably the 
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central place that declarations, accusations and judgments have in  “getting” COIs 
understood and managed in particular ways.  In examining COI discourse as performative 
speech acts, we are not denying that COIs “exist” in the world, and can be described as such. 
Facts about a researcher accepting money from a sponsor with a financial stake in the 
outcome of the research are important. What we are arguing, however, is that COI 
declarations, accusations and judgements about these “facts” do not merely describe a 
reality but ‘get something done’ in a specific social arrangement (Eagleton, 2007 19). 
 
Declarations as performative speech acts 
Declarations of COI are extremely common, and have become standardised speech acts that 
occur in academic publishing, grant applications, submission to public tender, at the 
commencement of adopting a public office and in a host of other scenarios.  Although there 
are a variety of procedures for declaration, most involve some form of public 
acknowledgement of an agent’s past or present relations, activities, services or associations 
with parties that could potentially have an interest that undermines the agent’s capacity to 
perform their primary task or role. These standardised speech acts can be understood as a 
form of ritual that both ‘fits’ the world and ‘constitutes it’ (Hall, 1999 185).That is, the COI 
declaration purports to ‘fit’ with certain facts about an agent’s relations or activities, but it 
also ‘constitutes’ a social reality in which these facts are to be understood. Rather than 
simply describe certain facts about a researcher’s relationship with a pharmaceutical 
company, a COI declaration effects a social reality in which the researcher and their work is 
understood. This performative function has both descriptive and normative components as 
it describes relationships and activities, but it also constituets a world in which these 
activities and the researcher are understood as trustworthy, authoritative, honest, or the 
opposite.  
 
Accusations as performative speech acts 
In contrast to declarations, which are highly formalised and standardised, accusations take 
many forms. Like COI declarations, accusations not only alert people to something that 
exists in the world, but also do things, such as ‘tainting’ individuals, institutions or work 
practices by altering the way they are regarded; shifting responsibility back onto the agent; 
condemning the individual, institution or practice as corrupt; and warning others. For 
example, in academic publishing, only the authors can declare a COI, yet anyone can accuse 
the author of having a COI that diminishes the authority and meaning of their work.  
 
Judgments as performative speech acts 
Judgement following a declaration or accusation of COI is different again. The judge is an 
authority – ombudsman, judge, Prime Minister – who determines whether a COI is, in fact, 
present when a declaration or accusation is made. A COI judgment thus confirms whether a 
COI declaration or accusation is felicitous or infelicitous. This judgement is itself both a 
description of something in the world and a performative utterance that transforms and 
shapes the world. In utterance of a judgement (by an appropriate judge) the status of a 
person transforms from the accused to the convicted as guilty, untrustworthy or corrupt or 
they can be acquitted. While the material conditions may not change, the utterance 
produces an effect that transforms the social reality.  
 
 In this way a judgment too can be felicitous or infelicitous depending on the social 
arrangements that grants authority to the judge. While there can be some confusion over 
the performative act of declarations and accusations, the question of who has the authority 
to judge is where there is the most uncertainty.  Other uncertainties include: how is the COI 
assessed and by what criteria, and what makes an effective or felicitous judgement?  
6 
 
  
In some cases, COI judgments are accepted without controversy. For example, The Integrity 
Commission in Tasmania (Australia) was established by an act of parliament (Integrity 
Commission Act 2009) to improve the standard of conduct, propriety and ethics in public 
authorities in Tasmania. In its 2014 Report on allegations of nepotism and conflict of interest 
by senior health managers, the Commission judged that conflicts of interest were apparent 
in a number of scenarios involving senior health administrators (Integrity Commission, 2014 
8). Based on this judgement, the Premier of Tasmania terminated the employment of two 
senior administrators.  
 
However, COI judgements are not always so clear or conclusive. The uncertainty is partly 
due to ambiguity of the authority of the judge. An ombudsman at a journal can investigate 
claims of COI, however the conclusiveness of his or her judgement is limited due to the 
extent of authority and social arrangements. For instance an ombudsman does not have the 
legislative power to access all the relevant information that may or may not determine if a 
COI is present and what its normative status should be. Investigations can take years and are 
often inconclusive. COI judgements are therefore difficult to perform in social arrangements 
whether there is not a specific authority.  
 
COI declarations, accusations and judgments thus describe certain factual relations, yet they 
also act upon and constitute a particular reality, producing effects in the world. Yet in order 
to achieve this felicitously, these speech acts are dependent on specific social arrangements 
and authorities. The merit of considering each of these aspects of the COI discourse as 
performative acts can be illustrated by reference to a major dispute regarding COI that 
surrounded the publication of a paper by Ian Hickie and Naomi Rogers in The Lancet.   
 
III. The Lancet and the Hickie and Rogers Case 
 
Professor Ian Hickie is an internationally renowned Professor of Psychiatry and Director of 
the Brain and Mind Institute at the University of Sydney, Australia. He has received 
numerous national and international awards recognizing his research, and has also held 
significant positions in advising governments on drugs and mental health reform. In 2009, 
Hickie and his colleague Naomi Rogers were commissioned by The Lancet to write a New 
Drug Class paper on antidepressant treatment strategies targeting the circadian system.  
 
Following a two year peer-review process, the article was published online on 18 May 2011 
and in print on 13 August 2011 (Hickie & Rogers, 2011). The article reviewed five distinct 
melatonin analogues and concluded by indicating that one of these analogues—
agomelatine—had potential benefit as an antidepressant. The published article included a 
lengthy conflicts of interest declaration. However, in the January 21 2012 issue, The Lancet 
published six letters criticising Hickie and Rogers. These critics explicitly or implicitly accused 
Hickie and Roger of having a COI due to their involvement with Servier Laboratories, the 
pharmaceutical company manufacturing agomelatine.  
 
This case is useful in illuminating the different performative features of declarations and 
accusations of COI and the way social arrangements can make a clear judgement of 
culpability extremely difficult.  
 
Declarative speech acts in the “Hickie and Rogers case” 
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The COI declaration accompanying Hickie and Rogers’s article was detailed and 
comprehensive. 
  
IBH was previously chief executive officer and clinical adviser of beyondblue, an 
Australian National Depression Initiative. He has led projects for health professionals 
and the community supported by governmental, community agency, and drug 
industry partners (Wyeth, Eli Lily, Servier, Pfizer, AstraZeneca) for the identification 
and management of depression and anxiety. He has served on advisory boards 
convened by the drug industry in relation to specific antidepressants, including 
nefazodone, duloxetine, and desvenlafaxine, and has participated in a multicentre 
clinical trial of agomelatine effects on sleep architecture in depression. IBH is also 
supported by a National Health and Medical Research Council Australian Medical 
Research Fellowship. He is a participant in a family-practice-based audit of sleep 
disturbance and major depression, supported by Servier, the manufacturers of 
agomelatine. NLR has received grant support from Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Servier, 
Pfizer, and Cephalon, and has received honoraria for lectures from Pfizer, CSL 
Biotherapies, and Servier. She has previously received research funding from Vanda 
Pharmaceuticals, manufacturers of tasimelteon. She has also received an 
unrestricted educational grant from Servier. Research studies done by IBH and NLR 
are mainly funded by NHMRC project and program grants (Hickie & Rogers, 2011). 
 
In this declaration, Hickie and Rogers list the facts about specific relations and activities they 
have undertaken, yet it insufficient to view this text as simply descriptive. Rather, it needs to 
be viewed as performing a particular act in the social arrangement of biomedical publishing. 
In this case, it produces at least four different effects i) it makes visible and known certain 
relations (transparency); ii) it implies permission that allows the continuation of the activity 
of publishing research; iii) it indicates absolution that defuses issues of secrecy through 
transparency; and iv) it shifts responsibility to readers who need to judge for themselves 
how to respond. 
 
Clearly, this declaration did not simply take the form “I/We declare that we have no conflicts 
of interest”. Written in the third person, it appeared to be a description of different 
relations, activities and services in which the authors had been engaged. Irrespective of the 
form in which the declaration was stated, it is consistent with Austin’s idea that 
performatives can be both implicit and explicit (Austin, 1975 32). Whether a performative is 
explicit or implicit often depends on the social arrangements and circumstances making it so 
(Austin, 1975 33)—in this case, the social arrangements mandated that a standarised 
declaration explicitly catalogue relations between the researchers and funders. Yet, in this 
explicit declaration is the implicit performative act of a ritual that minimises the perception 
that these funding relations alter the trustworthiness of the research.  
 
Accusatory speech acts in the “Hickie and Rogers case” 
 
Following the publication of the agomelatine review, six critical letters were published in The 
Lancet, all of which suggested that Hickie and Rogers had overstated the efficacy of 
agomelatine. (Barbui & Cipriani; Carroll; Howland; Jureidini & Raven; Lloret-Linares, 
Bergmann, & Mouly; Serfaty & Raven). The authors of three of these letters accused Hickie 
and Rogers of bias due to their relationship with Servier Laboratories. Jon Juredini and 
Melissa Raven argued that Hickie and Rogers’s relationship with Servier contributed to 
‘unjustified and misleading conclusions in the summary (abstract), withholding of 
information about serious adverse effects, citation misrepresentation, and possible conflicts 
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of interest’ (Jureidini & Raven). Bernard Carroll argued that the article ‘seems biased for 
promotional effect’, and questioned the role of Servier Laboratories in the research as well 
as drafting of the article (Carroll). In his letter, Carroll implicitly highlighted the effectiveness 
of Hickie and Rogers’s COI declaration as a performative speech act that allows the 
continuation of certain activities by claiming that Hickie and Rogers’s paper ‘seems to break 
new ground for sponsored writing in medical journals, with conflicts of interest hidden in 
plain sight while bias continues’ (Carroll). Carroll seemed to be arguing that, by exhaustively 
declaring COI, Hickie and Rogers had performed a social ritual that allowed their relationship 
with Servier Laboratories to continue and at the same time to enable publication of their 
manuscript.  Celia Lloret-Linares, Jean-François Bergmann and Stéphane Mouly warned 
readers that they ‘should be aware of Hickie and Rogers's numerous conflicts of interest 
with Servier’ (Lloret-Linares et al.). They then paraphrased Hickie and Rogers’ declaration 
and transformed it into an accusation that the ‘[c]linical trials and audit sponsored by 
Servier, unrestricted educational grants, consultancy fees, and honoraria for lectures might 
explain the subjective nature and inappropriateness of Hickie and Rogers's conclusions’ 
(Lloret-Linares et al.). 
 
Hickie and Rogers subsequently wrote a letter to The Lancet defending their integrity and 
the conclusions of their research. While Hickie and Roger’s response letter is where the 
matter ended with The Lancet, the case produced a great deal of discussion in Australian 
medical and general news media (Brill, 2012; Dunlevy, 2012; Phillips, Komesaroff, Kerridge, 
& Hemming, 2013; Ryan, 2012), largely due to the reputation and influence of Hickie as a 
researcher and adviser to government on policy relating to mental health reform. However, 
perhaps the most novel aspect of this critical discourse was the use of Twitter and its role in 
drawing wider attention to the matter. 
 
At the same time that the six critical letters were published in The Lancet, the editor of The 
Lancet, Richard Horton, used Twitter to question the integrity of Hickie’s research by 
suggesting that his speaking engagements with Servier Laboratories had influenced his 
analysis. Responding to a tweet by Melissa Raven, one of the letter writers, Horton stated 
that ‘the bias in this paper is very disturbing…[as the paper] purported to be an unbiased 
review of a new drug class’. Horton linked Hickie’s supposed bias to ‘the fact that …[he] took 
part in speaking engagements for the company [Servier] making one of these drugs’. He 
continued, ‘It’s a difficult thing when a clearly intelligent person does not see a problem in 
mixing pharma promotion with science. It’s explosive’.  Horton’s tweets thus added to the 
accusations against Hickie of bias, lack of transparency, and scientific misconduct resulting 
from his relationship to Servier Laboratories.   
 
Accusations of COI in biomedical publication produce effects in at least four ways: i) warning 
readers; ii) altering the social arrangements supporting certain reputations, ideas and 
practices; iii) tainting individuals and the profession; and iv) focusing attention on some 
features of an event, while defusing others. Importantly, accusations of COI in the social 
arrangement of academic publishing in general, and pharmacology in particular, can have 
significant consequences for a researcher’s reputation and integrity. Austin’s idea of warning 
as a performative speech act seems to be particularly salient here (1975 131). Depending on 
the relationship between the speech act and the facts, to warn or alert an audience 
produces a certain action or effect in the audience. It is not merely describing circumstances, 
but claiming that the circumstances warrant an action, such as avoidance. A warning also 
alters social relations.  
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In their accusation that Hickie and Rogers have a COI, Lloret-Linares, Bergmann and Mouly 
explicitly intended to warn readers and make them aware of the declared relationship with 
Servier. In doing so they performed an act that transformed, or at least questioned, the 
trustworthiness of Hickie and Rogers and the practice of declarations. Hickie and Rogers’s 
article thus became a potentially harmful or suspect piece of research that should be 
avoided or perhaps retracted.  
 
From Hickie and Rogers’s perspective, the accusations of COI made against them were 
consistent with Austin’s notion of a ‘misinvocation’ (Austin, 1975 17). That is, the 
accusations followed a procedure but misfired in performing the act because Hickie and 
Rogers had faithfully executed their disclosure, which purports to negate or minimise effects 
of potentially conflicting relationships. Following the initial accusations, Hickie and Rogers 
did not deny their relationships with Servier Laboratories, but appealed to the exhaustive 
disclosure of those relationships as evidence that they had dealt with them appropriately.  
 
‘…the paper was commissioned by The Lancet and developed solely by us. It was not 
initiated or supported financially by Servier Laboratories…Our other academic, 
educational, public research, and financial relationships with Servier Laboratories 
(and other government and industry-related entities) were disclosed exhaustively at 
the time of publication.’ 
 
While Hickie and Rogers implied that the COI accusations were infelicitous misinvocations 
(resulting in a misfire of a well-intended act of declaration), the accusations suggest that 
Hickie and Rogers’s COI declaration was an infelicitous abuse – where an act is professed but 
hollow and insincere (Austin, 1975 16ff). More specifically, the accusation was that Hickie 
and Rogers followed the procedure of declaring all interests, but did so in an insincere 
manner that hid COI in ‘plain sight while bias continue(d)’ (Carroll). Importantly, even if 
Hickie and Rogers are right, and these accusation or declarations are unhappy, they are not 
simply descriptive and still produce the effects described above (Austin, 1975 39ff).  
 
Austin argued that to alter the social arrangements such that reputations, ideas and 
practices are questioned requires a certain level of authority within that social arrangement 
(1975 14ff). In this instance, the authority of the letter writers stemmed from three sources. 
First, they have scientific expertise in the matter at hand. Second, all hold positions at 
reputable research institutions. Third, in going through the editorial process of The Lancet, 
an additional level of authority was added to their views that further legitimated their 
accusation of COI. Through this authority, these scholars were able to alter the way 
researchers, and a piece of research, were regarded and also call into question ideas of 
transparency and practices of declaration.  
 
Horton’s activities on Twitter are a particularly powerful illustration of the importance of 
authority for the effectiveness of accusatory speech acts.  As the editor of The Lancet, 
Horton has considerable authority, including procedural authority via privileged insight into 
the publication process of Hickie and Rogers’s article, and symbolic authority due to the 
reputation of The Lancet as one of the world’s leading medical journals. This authority was 
then amplified via his 13 000 Twitter followers, which extended and reinforced his influence 
into non-specialist publics. With this authority and access to a wide audience, Horton’s 
accusations of COI profoundly shaped the social reality in which the reputations of Hickie 
and Rogers exist. 
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Hickie was acutely alert to Horton’s power in this regard. In a commentary he wrote for the 
Australian online publication Crikey, he claimed that most of the criticisms of his article 
‘would have passed without further comment if it were not for the tweeting behaviour’ of 
Horton (Hickie, 2012). This comment is revealing not only for the impact of Twitter, but also 
for its implication that, in most other circumstances, where those concerned have less 
power, COI accusations almost always dissipate without having a clear impact. Horton’s 
tweets, in contrast, produced a snow-balling effect where more people became aware of the 
COI accusations and not only questioned the integrity of Hickie and Rogers’s article, but of 
Hickie’s work on mental health reform more generally. Hickie complained that ‘Horton’s 
intervention has given renewed life to this broader anti-psychiatry campaign in Australia’ 
(Hickie, 2012). 
 
Importantly, in altering social arrangements and tainting research and researchers, COI 
accusations focus attention on some features of COI, while defusing others. For example, the 
attention in social and general media focused on Hickie rather than Rogers. This was 
arguably due to Hickie’s reputation in Australia and Internationally. More significantly 
however was the almost exclusive focus on Hickie and Rogers rather than on The Lancet. 
Juredini and Raven and Caroll questioned The Lancet’s responsibility and potential financial 
benefits for allowing the article to be published, and Hickie also attempts to shift the focus 
towards Horton and The Lancet, stating: ‘If at any stage in this two-year process Dr Horton 
had genuinely believed I was personally compromised, or that our work was not of a 
sufficient academic standard, he could have decided not to proceed with publication’ 
(Hickie, 2012).  However, in tweeting accusations against Hickie, Horton successfully 
distanced The Lancet and his role as editor from the production of the article and minimised 
its responsibility for accepting the author’s COI declaration as sufficient. Horton tweeted: 
‘Peer review improved it, yet not enough.’ This mirrors the performance of COI declarations 
in placing responsibility on the reader by exhaustively making known all relations and then 
requiring them to judge how to respond.  
 
Judging speech acts in the “Hickie and Rogers case” 
 
The Hickie and Rogers case appears to have had no clear conclusion, most likely because it is 
not obvious who could, or should, have fulfilled the role of judge in this case. Horton could 
have assumed this role, yet his tweeting and other public comments placed him in the role 
of accuser. Hickie apparently lodged a complaint with The Lancet Ombudsman, who also 
could potentially have fulfilled the role of judge; however there has not yet been a report or 
judgement as to whether Hickie and Rogers held a COI or whether the accusations 
(especially Horton’s) were unfounded. The article has not been retracted and has been cited 
over 150 times. The letters remain public, as do Horton’s tweets, despite accusations that 
they ‘breach professional standards’ (Ryan, 2012).  
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
 
We have demonstrated how a performative analysis can illustrate the socially embedded 
nature of COI disputes, direct attention to the effects of declarations, accusations and 
judgements, and make salient questions of authority and the social conditions for normative 
assessment of COI. 
 
We anticipate a number of criticisms of this approach. Some may object that rather than 
clarifying COI, a performative analysis confuses and complicates our understanding of COIs 
in health and medicine. We do not deny that drawing attention to the social arrangements 
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and production of effects of COI discourse can be complex. However, this is the nature of 
COI. To pretend otherwise will permit problematic features of COI discourse to go 
unchecked or unnoticed. For example, viewing COI declarations as simple descriptions of the 
“truth” about COI, rather than as performative acts, we can easily come to see declarations 
as intrinsically good, and perhaps as sufficient for managing COI. In demonstrating the 
performative aspects of COI declarations,  we are not suggesting that such declarations are 
redundant. Indeed we recognise that they can convey important information to help readers 
evaluate the objectivity and trustworthiness of research (Resnik, 2013). However, in doing so 
the COI declaration shifts responsibility on to readers and allow the continuation of the 
status quo.   
 
Perhaps a more serious complaint against the analysis we have outlined is the dependence 
of felicitous or infelicitous declarations, accusations and judgements on social arrangements. 
Embedding COI in social arrangements can rub against simplistic applications of normative 
frameworks – deontology, utilitarianism and more recently principlism – that dominate 
ethical analyses in biomedical research and practice. Appeals to these frameworks often 
aspire to provide universal and objective direction. The performative analysis put forward 
here, and especially the notion of felicitous or infelicitous acts, troubles such aspirations. 
Rather than providing universal and objective principles, the performative approach requires 
careful analysis and attention of the discourse in relation to specific social arrangements. 
Although normative formulas such as Dennis Thompson’s, which define COIs as the presence 
of absence of troublesome personal interests or social commitments, can be helpful (1993), 
the conditions for COI judgement are dependent on the specific set of social arrangements 
in which COI discourse occur. To apply a simple of formula of whether a secondary interest 
undermines a primary interest invariably excludes aspects of the social arrangement that 
define and shape those interests. This is not to suggest normative formulas do not have a 
place, but that the performative dimension raises salient questions of power and authority, 
which helps to shed light on the role of social arrangements to “set-up” the normative 
concern (Erde, 1996 15).  
 
In summary, we contend that there are four advantages in conceiving COI discourse as 
performative speech acts: i) it addresses the effects of COI declarations/accusations; ii) it 
brings to light the social arrangements necessary for a declaration or accusation to be made; 
iii) it reveals the role of authoritative speakers in making COI declarations or accusation; and 
iv) rather than the fixed judgements of true/false or good/bad associated with descriptive 
and normative accounts, the performative analysis allows for a flexible account of using 
Austin’s notion of felicitous or infelicitous speech acts.  This analysis does not replace 
normative judgements of COI, but provides tools that can be used to ensure that such 
judgements can be made felicitously.  
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